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Direct	cash	transfers	to	households:	the	Bank	of
England’s	response	to	COVID-19	and	the	end	of
orthodoxy
With	the	Bank	of	England	likely	to	announce	a	further	£200bn	of	monetary	economic	stimulus	soon	to	combat	the
economic	impact	of	the	coronavirus	crisis,	Caroline	Bentham	argues	they	should	think	carefully	about	what	they
do	with	the	money.	She	makes	the	case	for	a	different	design	of	central	bank	monetary	stimulus	–	direct	money
transfers	to	households	–	and	explains	how	this	would	work.
The	coronavirus	crisis	has	been	a	time	of	unprecedented	change	and	upheaval	that	has	left	few	untouched.	While
the	immediate	impact	has	been	devastating	for	many,	with	change	comes	opportunity	for	review	and	progress.
Those	searching	for	silver	linings	are	citing	the	renewed	value	for	what	really	matters-	spending	time	with	loved
ones,	a	more	relaxed	pace	of	life,	supporting	our	community.
As	put	by	the	new	Chancellor	in	charge	of	UK	government	finance,	Rishi	Sunak:	‘This	is	not	a	time	for	ideology	and
orthodoxy,	this	is	a	time	to	be	bold	–	a	time	for	courage.’	Economic	orthodoxies	are	dissolving	in	the	face	of	the
challenge	presented	by	the	physical	health	emergency	and	the	direct	and	indirect	economic	impacts	of	that.
Governments	internationally	have	defied	their	own	spending	rules	to	tackle	the	pandemic	and	the	economic
downturn	which	is	now	unfolding-	the	same	rules	which	demanded	austerity	measures	which	ravaged	the	UK	over
the	last	decade.
I	have	written	previously	on	the	issue	of	where	the	money	to	combat	the	virus	is	coming	from,	and	how	that	money
might	be	paid	back	–	there	is	no	magic	money	tree,	fiscal	spending	will	have	to	be	paid	for	eventually,	and	now	is
the	time	to	try	the	alternatives	to	austerity.
The	other	major	tool	of	macroeconomic	policy	that	receives	less	public	attention	is	monetary	policy.	The
independent	Bank	of	England	controls	monetary	policy,	under	the	rationale	that	technical	experts	are	the	best
people	to	make	decisions	about	the	plumbing	of	the	financial	system,	rather	than	politicians.	This	ethos	perhaps
makes	a	lot	of	sense	if	we	do	think	of	the	central	bank’s	role	as	like	a	plumber	–	tinkering	with	the	practical
operational	parts	to	make	sure	that	finance	can	flow	freely.	However,	this	makes	less	sense	if	we	consider	the
unconventional	programs	of	Quantitative	Easing	finance	enacted	by	the	central	banks	of	many	of	the	biggest
economies	since	2009.
From	2009	onwards,	the	UK’s	program	of	supposedly	temporary	quantitative	easing	grew	and	was	never	stopped,
reaching	£445bn.	Yes,	billion	–	roughly	30%	of	total	UK	GDP.	The	Bank	of	England	generates	loans	like	any	other
bank,	so	it	created	this	massive	pot	of	cash	and	used	it	to	buy	mostly	government	bonds.	Some	say	that
quantitative	easing	is	almost	the	same	as	funding	fiscal	spending	directly	because	the	central	banks	are	indirectly
buying	a	lot	of	government	bonds	anyway,	and	some	central	banks	are	even	providing	short-term	direct	overdraft-
type	facilities	to	governments.	The	main	difference	is	that	central	banks	are	keeping	tight	control	of	the	quantity,
timespan,	timing	and	so	on:	they	call	all	the	shots,	not	the	government.	This	is	to	prevent	the	threat	of	spiralling
price	inflation	that	can	happen	where	a	government	controls	the	ability	to	create	new	finance.
Quantitative	easing	was	originally	designed	to	stimulate	the	economy	out	of	the	recession	brought	on	by	the	global
financial	crisis.	But	this	stimulus	policy’s	deliberate	effects	since	2009	include	making	rich	people	richer	and
had	questionable	benefits	as	to	how	much	it	supported	the	finances	of	everyone	else.	There’s	evidence	that	it
increased	intergenerational	and	wealth	inequality	through	effects	like	driving	up	house	prices.
Figure	1:	Effects	of	monetary	policy	changes	since	2007	on	net	wealth	by	wealth	decile	in	cash	terms
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Note:	Graphic	produced	by	Bank	of	England	staff.
The	Bank	of	England	insist	it’s	not	their	job	to	prevent	social	side-effects	of	monetary	policy-	their	only	job	is	to
control	price	inflation	by	stimulating	the	economy	when	necessary,	and	the	government	needs	to	implement	policies
to	offset	social	inequalities	caused	by	central	bank	policies.
A	potential	different	design	of	central	bank	monetary	stimulus	is	direct	money	transfers	to	households.	The	Bank	of
England’s	own	research	shows	cash	transfers	to	households	could	be	just	as	effective	as	quantitative	easing	at
stimulating	the	economy.	Studies	of	programs	of	universal	payments	to	households	show	the	endless	potential
benefits.	Pilot	studies	of	basic	income	payments	to	households	have	found	benefits	for	a	wide	range	of	social
wellbeing	factors:	a	recent	1-year	study	in	Finland	found	improved	levels	of	mental,	physical	and	financial	wellbeing
for	recipients;	a	similar	study	in	Namibia	found	positive	results	in	areas	like	reduced	community	poverty	and	crime
rates	and	improved	education	attendance.	Researchers	in	Canada	proposed	a	basic	income	pilot	on	the	basis	of
evidence	that	it	could	reduce	domestic	violence,	as	greater	financial	independence	supports	abuse	victims	to	walk
away	from	abusive	relationships.
A	recent	study	of	how	basic	income	could	be	implemented	in	the	UK	finds	the	fundamental	issues	are	of	fiscal
affordability	and	how	to	sufficiently	support	incomes	of	people	in	need.	But	this	policy	proposal	would	never	be
intended	as	a	universal	basic	income.	This	is	the	Bank	of	England	carrying	out	monetary	policy	easing	to	stimulate
the	economy.	If	the	Bank	of	England	is	going	to	inject	this	amount	of	cash	into	the	economy	anyway,	the	issue	of
affordability	has	already	been	decided	as	null	(though	see	here	for	arguments	against	this).	The	payments	would
not	be	designed	to	provide	a	full	income:	it	would	be	a	more	equitable	distribution	of	funds	which	otherwise	might	be
hoarded	by	the	financial	sector	as	the	Bank	of	England	acknowledges	happened	in	rounds	of	quantitative	easing
over	the	last	decade.
The	coronavirus	crisis	has	caused	a	set	of	circumstances	where	a	cash	boost	to	households	could	be	exactly	what
can	best	support	both	social	wellbeing	and	economic	recovery:	the	US	Treasury	recently	announced	they	are	giving
all	but	the	highest	earners	$1200	per	person.	A	thriving	financial	sector	is	unsustainable	if	the	lives	of	the	masses	of
normal	people	are	crumbling.
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The	Bank	of	England	announced	an	additional	£200bn	of	quantitative	easing	in	March	and	has	said	it	is	possible
they	could	announce	more	in	the	near	future,	perhaps	as	soon	as	their	next	meeting	on	18	June.	In	this	time	of
established	economic	orthodoxies	being	swept	away,	it	is	time	to	accept	that	the	social	impact	of	economic	policies
does	matter.	The	design	of	central	bank	policies	does	matter.	Further	rounds	of	monetary	stimulus	must	consider
how	effectively	it	supports	the	economy	and	society	in	the	context	of	the	COVID-19	crisis,	especially	if	it	is	never
paid	back,	as	the	Bank	of	England	plans	a	large	chunk	of	their	previous	rounds	of	quantitative	easing	to	never	be
paid	back.
If	the	Bank	announces	a	further	monetary	policy	stimulus	of	£200bn,	that	equates	to	£3000	for	every	person	in	the
UK.	This	could	be	paid	to	individuals	as	a	lump	sum,	or	it	could	be	paid	as	an	income	support	grant	of	£250	per
month	per	person	for	a	year.	This	is	not	supposed	to	replace	any	social	security	income	support	but	be	a	one-off
coronavirus	crisis	policy	in	addition	to	fiscal	spending.	Conceptually	at	least,	this	represents	somewhat	equitable
treatment	if	we	consider	that	a	person	earning	£100k	would	receive	3%	of	their	income	while	a	person	earning	£6k
would	receive	a	50%	income	boost.	A	universal	rate	also	reduces	the	cost	and	bureaucracy	barriers	to	everyone
receiving	it,	but	leaves	the	possibility	of	the	government	reaping	some	back	through	taxation	for	higher	earners.
This	type	of	policy	proposal	has	long	been	considered	taboo	so	frustratingly	little	direct	academic	research	has
been	conducted	on	it,	though	there	is	new	interest	in	the	coronavirus	context.	Cognate	examples	of	short-term
stimulus	payment	programs	like	basic	income	pilots,	one-off	tax	rebates	and	small	lottery	wins	can	provide	clues	as
to	what	the	design	and	outcomes	could	be.	Quantitative	easing	and	other	unconventional	uses	of	central	bank
money	were	also	considered	taboo	before	2008.
As	Rishi	Sunak	has	urged,	now	is	the	time	for	bold	action.	Policy	makers	must	decide	whether	to	maintain	orthodox
paradigms	for	which	evidence	is	faltering,	or	have	the	courage	to	consider	alternative	policies	in	this	time	of	change.
___________________
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